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Abstract—Privacy preservation is one of the greatest concerns in big data. As one of extensive applications in big data, privacy
preserving data publication (PPDP) has been an important research field. One of the fundamental challenges in PPDP is the trade-off
problem between privacy and utility of the single and independent data set. However, recent research has shown that the advanced
privacy mechanism, i.e., differential privacy, is vulnerable when multiple data sets are correlated. In this case, the trade-off problem
between privacy and utility is evolved into a game problem, in which payoff of each player is dependent on his and his neighbors’
privacy parameters. In this paper, we firstly present the definition of correlated differential privacy to evaluate the real privacy level of a
single data set influenced by the other data sets. Then, we construct a game model of multiple players, in which each publishes data
set sanitized by differential privacy. Next, we analyze the existence and uniqueness of the pure Nash Equilibrium. We refer to a notion,
i.e., the price of anarchy, to evaluate efficiency of the pure Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we show the correctness of our game analysis via
simulation experiments.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, privacy preservation, game theory, big data.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH rapid development of information and commu-nication technologies, people have stepped into the
age of big data. Every day, a tremendous amount of raw
data from various sources, such as social websites, online
shopping and transportations, is generated rapidly. The
occurence of big data brings us a great opportunity to
significantly improve our insights in all aspects of human
society. Even though, privacy preservation has been one of
the most serious problems, which hampers further growth
of big data [1], [2], [3]. As one of extensive applications in
the big data processing, privacy-preserving data publication
(PPDP) has attracted a lot of attention from academia and
industry [4], [5]. That is, data needs to be sanitized via pri-
vacy preservation mechanisms so as to provide the privacy
guarantee against the leakage of the sensitive information
before it is published to the public. Among the existing
privacy mechanisms (e.g., k-anonymity [6], l-diversity [7],
t-closeness [8]), differential privacy [9], [10] has emerged
as a rigorous mathematical definition of privacy require-
ment, which ensures that adding or deleting a single record
doesn’t affect the outcome of any analysis.
While those privacy-preserving mechanisms prevent
users’ privacy leakage, it inevitably causes the utility loss of
data [11]. Naturally, one of the most important challenges is
to research the trade-off problem between privacy and util-
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ity, which aims to maximize the data utility compromised
by privacy constraints. There have been a large number of
studies about the trade-off problem, which is not limited
to big data. In general, it is divided into two categories.
The first one is to compare the utility of different privacy-
preserving mechanisms [12], [13], [14], while the second one
is to choose the optimal privacy parameter to maximize the
utility [15], [16]. For these issues, it always assumes that
the data sets are independent with each other in terms of
privacy. That is, it just needs to consider the privacy-utility
trade-off of a single data set without the privacy influence
of the other data sets.
However, in the age of big data, someone’s information
may be stored by multiple data sets with the same or similar
types. For example, someone uploads his true trajectory to
the social website (e.g., Twitter and/or Facebook). Mean-
while, this trajectory is also submitted to a third party for
location-aware applications in location based services. In
recent years, there have been a series of research works
[11], [17], [18], [19], [20] showing that differential privacy
is vulnerable when multiple data sets are correlated, though
it provides a strong privacy guarantee to the independent
data sets. In other words, the privacy level of some data set
is influenced not only by this data set’s privacy parameter,
but also by its neighbor data sets’ privacy parameters. Here,
we take a simple example similar to the literature [11], [20]
to illustrate this correlated privacy relationship, which is
presented as follows.
Example 1. Consider a relatively extreme example, which
has two different groups of data sets about health in-
formation. (1) The first group has ten same data sets,
which are strongly correlated with each other. (2) The
second group has ten fully disjoint data sets, all of which
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Fig. 1: Correlated data publication via -differential privacy
have no correlation with each other. Suppose that an
“adversary” knows all the information of individuals in
data sets except Jack. This adversary attempts to ask
“whether or not Jack is in the data sets?”. In order
to protect Jack’s health information, we use Laplace
mechanism giving -differential privacy, where the final
answer to the adversary’s query in every data set is the
true query plus the noise query Laplace(1/). In the first
group, the sum of the query result is 0 or 10. In the
second group, the sum of the query result is 0 or 1, since
only one data set includes Jack’s health information. As
a result, to guarantee privacy of the same level in two
groups, the noise added to each data set in the first
group is Laplace(1/0.1), while the noise in the second
group is Laplace(1/). 0.1 <  implies that the privacy
requirement of each data set in the first group is higher
than that in the second group.
Under the case of the correlated data sets in terms of
privacy, it should not be just limited to analyzing the trade-
off problem between privacy and utility in a single data
set. More precisely, the trade-off problem in the single data
set can be evolved into a game problem among different
individuals, who publish their data sets via the perturbed
process i.e., the privacy-preserving mechanism and the pri-
vacy parameter, respectively. As shown in Fig. 1, the privacy
level of data set 2 with -differential privacy is dependent
not only on his own parameter  = 0.1, but also on the
privacy parameters of his neighbors (e.g., data set 1 with
 = 0.2). In this case, what is the true privacy level of data
set 2? More importantly, the fundamental question is: “how
many privacy parameters does each data set adopt to maximize his
utility in correlated data sets?”.
1.1 Objective and Challenges
The objective of this paper is to analyze the differential pri-
vacy parameter choices in correlated network data sets and
maximize the utility of each data set. However, studying
this problem still suffers from several main challenges listed
as follows.
• The first challenge is how to describe the correlated
relationship between different data sets in terms of
privacy. Especially, when the correlated data sets
change the privacy parameters, what is the influence
on the objective data set?
• The second challenge is how to design the reasonable
measure about the utility of a sanitized data set. In
general, the higher the privacy parameter, the worse
the utility of data is. According to the utility measure,
the following is to compute the utility of data.
• The third challenge is how to evaluate data owners’
value of privacy. Although someone has taken some
privacy preserving actions, it is still possible to cause
the privacy leakage. Therefore, it is a key to measure
the value of privacy.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions in this paper can be summarized as fol-
lows.
• In order to construct a game model of multiple
players to release their own data sets which each
is sanitized by anonymization mechanisms, we mea-
sure the differential privacy relationship of correlated
data sets, the utility of sanitized data, and the value
of privacy.
• We make game analysis based on the game model.
We demonstrate the sufficient conditions of the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the pure Nash Equilibrium
in the game. Especially, we show that the existence
of the pure Nash Equilibrium fully depends on some
player and his neighbors, when considering a single
player.
• We utilize the price of anarchy to evaluate the effi-
ciency of the pure Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate
the lower bound of the price of anarchy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we briefly survey the related works. In Section
3, we introduce the preliminaries about differential privacy
and its composition properties. In Section 4, we present a
definition of differential privacy in correlated datasets. In
Section 5, we construct a game model of correlated privacy.
In Section 6, we make game analysis. In Section 7, we
evaluate the correctness of our game analysis via simulation
experiments. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Tradeoff Between Privacy and Utility
The tradeoff between privacy and utility of data is one
of the most challenging problems in privacy-preserving
data publication. In detail, it aims to maximize the utility,
compromised by a certain number of privacy requirements.
There have been a large number of works to study this
problem. The works can be split into two categories, i.e.,
the privacy mechanism design and the privacy parameter
choice.
For privacy mechanism design, researchers generally
discussed this from the perspective of theory and appli-
cation, respectively. The first and key step in theoretical
analysis is how to evaluate utility of anonymous data, re-
gardless of adopting which privacy-preserving mechanism.
To this end, Lin et al. [13], [14], [21] continuously studied the
information-preserving properties of utility measures and
then proposed a series of utility axioms. Based on these
utility axioms, they [22] demonstrated that the solution to
maximize the utility is a mechanism, whose matrix form
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consists of linearly independent rows. However, the pro-
posed utility measure is not necessarily practical, since it
ignores the actual application of data (e.g., prediction in data
mining). Li et al. [23] proposed a unifying framework, i.e.,
membership privacy, to compare the utility of the existing
privacy notions. Even though, to the best of our knowledge,
the most of the previous research still focuses on designing
the optimal mechanism based on differential privacy from
the perspective of application.
As a rigorous standard of privacy definition, differential
privacy has attracted a large number of researchers to design
the optimal mechanism for privacy preservation in different
scenarios. Ghosh et al. [12] pointed out that for any count
query and differential privacy, the geometric mechanism is
simultaneously expected loss-minimizing of the data set,
subject to the differential privacy constraint. However, some
literature showed that no universally optimal mechanism
exists in some scenarios, such as histograms and two or
more count queries [24] and count-range queries [25]. Bren-
ner et al. [24] found that there is a universally optimal
mechanism when it is a single count query. Zeng et al. [25]
showed that the optimal differentially private mechanisms
exist in “threshold” queries. Yuan et al. [26] showed that it is
very difficult to design an optimal strategy maximizing the
result accuracy, since this is a complex constrained and non-
convex optimization program. Meanwhile, they utilized
(, δ)-differential privacy to design a suitable mechanism.
For privacy parameter choice, the intuitive objective is
to obtain more utility, constrained by a certain amount of
privacy requirements. Although differential privacy gener-
ally has no assumptions about data, Kifer et al. [11] utilized
no free lunch theorem to state that it is not possible to
provide privacy and utility under no assumptions about
the generation of data. They found that differential privacy
still possibly causes privacy breaches when the notion of
participation varies. In order to maximize the utility subject
to the privacy constraints, He et al. [15] proposed a new
definition of Blowfish Privacy to tune privacy-utility trade-
offs. Xu et al. [16] utilized a contract theoretic approach and
designed optimal contracts to direct data owners how to
decide their privacy parameters, when there is a collector
to collect data from owners. In addition, some researchers
attempt to design utility-aware privacy-preserving mech-
anisms. Makhdoumi et al. [27] propose utility-aware pri-
vacy mechanisms to defend inference attacks in the case
where statistical knowledge is uncertain. Prasser et al.
[28] proposed a utility-driven heuristic search strategy to
anonymize high-dimensional datasets.
2.2 Correlated Privacy Definitions
Though differential privacy provides a strong privacy guar-
antee, it still suffers from some new challenges. One of the
severe challenges is the increase of privacy breach risk in
correlated data, which was firstly found in [11]. In order to
remedy this defect, Kifer et al. [17] utilized differential pri-
vacy and defined a new privacy framework named Puffer-
fish, which considers the correlated data. Correspondingly,
the existing differential-privacy-based mechanisms are not
suitable for this new privacy framework. To this end, Wang
et al. [29] proposed the Wasserstein Mechanism, which can
be applied into any Pufferfish framework. By adding an
extra parameter to evaluate the extent of correlation, Chen et
al. [18] demonstrated that differential privacy still provides
privacy guarantee in the correlated data and needs some ad-
justment. Considering the correlated level between records,
Zhu et al. [19] defined a correlated sensitivity and designed
a correlated data releasing mechanism in non-IID data set.
Yang et al. [20] proposed a new definition called Bayesian
differential privacy, by which a probabilistic perturbation
algorithm is designed to evaluate the privacy level.
2.3 Game Theory
As a useful analysis tool, game theory [30] has been widely
applied into data privacy game to analyze users’ behavior.
For example, Freudiger et al. [31] constructed and analyzed
a non-cooperative game model, in which each player, i.e.,
mobile node, attempts to maximize its location privacy with
a minimum cost. Wang et al. [32] constructed a zero-sum
stochastic game, in which users who utilize their contexts
to obtain personalized services have the interactive privacy
competition with each other. Shokri [33], [34] proposed user-
centric obfuscation strategies to maximize utility with satis-
fying users’ privacy requirements, when users send their
data to a potentially untrusted service provider. Based on
game theory, Wang et al. [35] design a payment mechanism
to control the quality of data from different users, who
each considers his own privacy requirement. In addition,
some auction mechanisms are proposed, in which privacy
is viewed as a commodity to be sold [36], [37].
On the other hand, some researchers studied the game
of multiple different roles. Xiao et al. [38] studied the inter-
actions between a subjective cloud storage defender and a
subjective Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) attacker. By
game analysis, they also proposed a Q-learning based APT
defense strategy for cloud storage. Chessa et al. [39] formu-
lated a game-theoretic model, in which individuals take con-
trol over participation and data analysts set requirements
for data precision. Gao et al. [40] formulated a repeated
public-goods game between cloud users and cloud service
providers about cloud data security and privacy protection.
Bernhard et al. [41] focused on the privacy of voting schemes
and proposed a game-based definition of privacy. Chen et al.
[42] analyzed the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior
of selfish agents and gave the Nash equilibrium analysis.
Here, privacy concerns are usually explained as bringing
loss for utility functions.
Although there have been a number of game studies
about data privacy, these studies are just limited to some
special scenarios, e.g., location privacy. Unfortunately, this
cannot be applied into other general scenarios. Besides, cor-
related data makes self-interest users attempt to maximize
their own utility, while their privacy is influenced with each
other. To the best of our knowledge, there is little work to
utilize game theory to analyze users’ behavior in correlated
data sets. Therefore, we construct a game model and make
game analysis.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we mainly introduce the preliminaries about
differential privacy and its composition properties.
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3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is not only a gold standard of privacy
definition, but also a rigorous mathematic definition. We
present a formal definition of -differential privacy as fol-
lows.
Definition 3.1 (-Differential Privacy [9]). Suppose that D
is a set of data sets, which are differing on at most
one record. A privacy mechanismM gives -differential
privacy if for any pair of data sets D1, D2 ∈ D, and for
any output O ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(D1) ∈ O] ≤ exp()× Pr[M(D2) ∈ O], (1)
where the privacy parameter  is the privacy budget.
The higher value of  corresponds to the lower privacy
protection.
In general, a mechanism giving -Differential Privacy is
related to the sensitivity of a query function, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Global Sensitivity [9]). For any query Q :




where data set D1 and D2 differ in at most one record.
In order to achieve -differential privacy, there are two
standard mechanisms proposed by the previous literature.
They are the Laplace mechanism [9] and the exponential mecha-
nism [43]. Here, we mainly focus on the Laplace mechanism.
Definition 3.3 (Laplace Mechanism [9]). For any query Q :
D→ Rd, the following mechanism
M(D) = Q(D) + Laplace(∆Q/) (3)
provides -differential privacy.
3.2 Composition Properties
Furthermore, differential privacy also considers the issues
of privacy composition, in which multiple queries may be
taken together so as to degrade the privacy guarantee. The
literature [44] has shown that any group of the privacy
mechanisms that each gives differential privacy in isolation
also give differential privacy. This is called sequential compo-
sition as follows.
Lemma 3.4 (Sequential composition [44]). Suppose that ev-
ery privacy mechanismMi gives i-differential privacy.




Here, from the point of view of the composition of
data sets, it is obvious that if there are more and more
data sets, the privacy guarantee under differential privacy
is becoming worse and worse. Meanwhile, the number of
data sets decides the upper bound of the privacy guarantee.
For sequential composition, it assumes that the data sets are
fully same. In contrast, when a group of queries are applied
to a set of the disjoint data sets, the privacy guarantee is
improving, compared to the same data sets. This is called
parallel composition, which is given as follows.
Lemma 3.5 (Parallel composition [44]). Suppose that every
privacy mechanism Mi gives i-differential privacy. A











(a) The first group








p A’s record deleted
No record deleted
(b) The second group
Fig. 2: Illustration for Example 2 with  = 1/2
group of Mi(Di) over a set of disjoint data sets Di
provides max(i)-differential privacy.
The relationship between data sets in sequential or par-
allel composition of differential privacy is relatively simple.
In fact, the relationship between data sets is rather complex.
No matter whether the relationship between data sets is
complex or simple in terms of privacy, we can get the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that the privacy mechanism Mi gives
i-differential privacy. A group of Mi(Di) over a set
of data sets Di provides ∗-differential privacy, where
max(i) ≤ ∗ ≤
∑
i i.
Proof: Obviously, Theorem 3.6 can be extended from
Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5.
In order to illustrate this theorem, we give a simple
example as follows.
Example 2. Similar to Example 1, suppose that there are
two different data groups, which each has two data sets
Dji (i, j = 1, 2). Each data set has 3 records. In the first
group, both of datasets have record A, while in the
second group, only one has record A. Here, a query
Q is to release the number of records in each group,
perturbed by the Laplace mechanism Laplace(∆Q/),
where ∆Q = 1. Since the output of a query is oi =
Q(D1i , D
2
i )+Lap(1/), the density function of the output
is p(oi) = 2 exp(−|oi − Q(D1i , D2i )|). The concrete
result is shown in Fig. 2, in which  = 1/2. Obviously,
the results imply that the first group cannot give 1/2-
differential privacy, while the second group still provides
1/2-differential privacy.
4 DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN CORRELATED DATA
SETS
4.1 Characterizations of Correlated Relationship in
Data Sets
Through the discussion in Section 3, a privacy mechanism
M giving -differential privacy over a data set cannot
hold the same privacy guarantee when there are multiple
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correlated data sets. It is a need to measure the relationship
between correlated data sets in terms of privacy so as to
compute the real privacy level of a data set.
In general, the relationship of records about some user
in different data sets is split into two types as follows.
• Direct Relationship: This relationship is strictly de-
fined as two fully same records. For example, a user
simultaneously submits his tourist information to
Facebook and Twitter. As a result, two different data
sets have one same record about some user.
• Indirect Relationship: Different from the direct rela-
tionship, this relationship is more complex and de-
fined as two different records about some user or his
correlated users. For instance, information streams
of some user’s activity, e.g., GPS records and social
networks records, are correlated with each other.
Besides, [11] has shown that the privacy of correlated
individuals may be compromised when their records
are correlated.
It is easy to find that sequential composition and parallel
composition are just suited for the direct relationship rather
than the indirect relationship. In order to measure the pri-
vacy of the records with indirect relationship, a lot of work
has been carried. Zhu et al. [19] utilized a correlated degree
matrix to present the relationships between correlated data
sets. In this case, the sensitivity of a query is changed into
correlated sensitivity, which is the maximum among record
sensitivities. However, this correlated privacy definition has
a serious disadvantage. That is, the correlated relationship
between data sets is static but not dynamic. Once some data
set adjusts its privacy level, the static matrix doesn’t change
the privacy relationship. On the other hand, Yang et al. [20]
proposed a Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) on corre-
lated data sets. The idea is to utilize a Bayesian way to
analyze an uncertain query, accompanied with some given
and unknown tuples. In this paper, we follow [19], [20] and
give our own definition of correlated differential privacy.
4.2 Definitions
Here, we draw lessons from these two approaches and
define our own correlated privacy preserving of multiple
data sets, which is given as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Correlated Differential Privacy). Suppose
that D = {D1, D2, · · · , Dn} is the vector of the data
sets, all of which include one or more than records of
some user or his correlated users. Data set D1i and D
2
i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) generated from Di are neighbor if they are
differing on at most one record about some user, while
the other records are fully same. A correlated privacy
mechanismM is a randomized function whose domain







Pr[M(D1i ) ∈ O | D−i]
Pr[M(D2i ) ∈ O | D−i]
,
(4)
in which D−i = D \ {Di}. As a result, we say a privacy
mechanismM gives -correlated differential privacy if
− ≤ CDPL(M) ≤ . (5)
4.3 CDP vs. DP and CDP vs. BDP
The correlated differential privacy is an extension of dif-
ferential privacy. Compromised by the correlated data sets,
CDP also ensures that removing or adding a record in an
objective data set doesn’t (substantially) leak the privacy of
some user. The only difference between CDP and DP is that
CDP considers the influence of the correlated data sets, i.e.,
D−i. Obviously, if the data sets are independent, CDP is
changed into DP.
CDP is actually an extreme case of BDP. In other words,
CDP sets up U = [n] \ {i} \ K and K = ∅ in the definition
of BDP, where an adversary denoted by A(i,K) is a person
who knows all of the records in K and tries to attack the
user i, and the set of unknown records is U . In this paper,
we assume that the correlated records are stored in different
data sets so that the adversary cannot know these records
and U = [n] \ {i}.
4.4 Dynamic Privacy Choices
Here, we take an example with the truncated geometric
mechanism (TGM) to clearly illustrate the dynamic privacy
choices with CDP. The truncated geometric mechanism [12]
is a discretized version and approximation guarantee for the
Laplace Mechanism.
Definition 4.2 (Truncated Geometric Mechanism [12]). For
any count query Q : D → N , the truncated α-geometric
mechanism is defined as follows. For α ∈ (0, 1), the
mechanism gives the output Q(D) + ∆, where ∆ is
derived from the following geometric distribution:




αQ(D), for δ = −Q(D)
1− α
1 + α
α|δ|, for −Q(D) < δ < n−Q(D)
1
1 + α
αn−Q(D), for δ = n−Q(D)
0, for otherwise
(6)
Besides, for α = 0, the mechanism always outputs the
true query result Q(D), while for α = 1, the mechanism
always outputs 0. Therefore, the mechanism gives -
differential privacy, in which  = ln(1/α).
Obviously, the higher value of α corresponds to the
higher privacy protection, since  is decreasing. The trun-
cated α-geometric mechanism has a distinct characteriza-
tion, which is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Main Characterization of TGM [12]). For
n ≥ 1, α ∈ [0, 1], and a count query Q, a privacy
mechanism M is universally maximizing if and only if
the mechanism M can be remapped into the truncated
α-geometric mechanism via a mapping Y .
Meanwhile, [12] has demonstrated that the Laplace
mechanism cannot be universally utility maximizing. The-
orem 4.3 implies that if someone uses the truncated α-
geometric mechanism, he needn’t consider the decision
problem between different privacy preserving mechanisms
and just focuses on the privacy parameter α. Therefore,
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-geometric mechanism with n = 2
Input/Output 0 1 2
0 2/3 1/6 1/6
1 1/3 1/3 1/3
2 1/6 1/6 2/3
in the following sections to construct the game model,
we always utilize the truncated α-geometric mechanism. A
simple example of the α-truncated geometric mechanism is
shown in Table 1, in which α = 1/2 and n = 2. In the
following, we focus on the influence on a data set when its
correlated data set gives different -differential privacy.
Example 3. Assume that there are two data sets D1 and
D2. The data set D1 has a single record, whose value 0
and 1 have probability 50%, respectively. The data set
D2 adopts the α-truncated geometric mechanism with
n = 1 and Input = 1. When α of D2 is 1/2, the
correlated relationship between D1 and D2 is shown in
Table 2(a). In this case, when D1 also adopts the 1/2-
truncated geometric mechanism shown in Table 1 (i.e.,







Pr[o|D1 = 0, D2] Pr[D2|D1 = 0]∑
D2
Pr[o|D1 = 1, D2] Pr[D2|D1 = 1]
= log
2/3 · 2/3 + 1/3 · 1/3




≈ 1.20 > log 1
0.5
≈ 0.69 = ,
in which o = 0.
Here, the output of Q(D1) is 0 and CDPL(M) > 
shows that it doesn’t satisfy -differential privacy.
Example 4. Similar to Example 3, when parameter value α
of D1 and D2 is 1/2 and 2/3 respectively, the correlated
relationship between D1 and D2 is given in Table 2(b).







Pr[o|D1 = 0, D2] Pr[D2|D1 = 0]∑
D2
Pr[o|D1 = 1, D2] Pr[D2|D1 = 1]
= log
2/3 · 3/5 + 1/3 · 2/5




≈ 0.98 > log 1
0.5
≈ 0.69 = ,
in which o = 0.
The result of Example 4 is that CDPL(M) of data set
D1 is greater than . This shows that it doesn’t satisfy -
differential privacy, either. More importantly, comparing Ex-
ample 3 with Example 4, we can find that as the parameter
α of D2 increases from 1/2 to 2/3, i.e.,  decreasing from ln 2
to ln 3/2, the CDPL(M) of D1 decreases from 1.20 to 0.98.
It means that as the correlated data set improves privacy
preserving, the privacy of risk of the objective data set is
TABLE 2: Correlation relationship between D1 and D2
(a) D2 with n = 1, α =
1
2
and Input = 1
D2 = 0 D2 = 1 Total
D1 = 0 1/3 1/6 1/2
D1 = 1 0 1/2 1/2
Total 1/3 2/3 1
(b) D2 with n = 1, α =
2
3
and Input = 1
D2 = 0 D2 = 1 Total
D1 = 0 3/10 1/5 1/2
D1 = 1 1/10 2/5 1/2
Total 2/5 3/5 1
degrading. Therefore, we can derive that the data sets affect
the privacy level with each other.
5 GAME MODEL OF CORRELATED DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY
When some data publisher considers publishing his data,
one of the most important problems is to adopt which
privacy preserving mechanism is appropriate and decide
what privacy parameter is optimal. Under the case of inde-
pendent data sets, this is the well-known trade-off problem
between privacy and utility [11], [16], [45]. However, since
someone’s private guarantee of data set depends not only
on his own privacy parameter, but also on the privacy
parameter of his neighbors shown in Section 4.4, his privacy
choice is changed from the trade-off problem to a game
problem. About privacy preserving mechanism, Section 4.4
has illustrated that the truncated α-geometric mechanism is
a great option, because it is universally utility maximizing.
Therefore, in the following, we assume all of data publishers
adopt the truncated α-geometric mechanism and just focus
on the choice of the privacy parameter.
When some data publisher decides what the privacy
parameter is, he also needs to consider what the privacy
parameter of his neighbors is. To this end, game theory is
a well-suited analytical tool to discuss the case, in which
players affect the payoff with each other. A game is a field
to describe the strategic interaction, including the players’
strategies and payoffs [30]. A desired solution is to system-
atically present the outcomes that may emerge in a specified
game. For this, game theory suggests reasonable solutions
for this game and examines their properties.
5.1 Formulation of Correlated Privacy Game
Suppose that there is a finite game G = (N,S, U), which
consists of:
• a finite set N = {1, · · · , n} of players, i.e., data
publishers;
• a finite strategy space Si for each player i ∈ N ;
• a payoff function ui(s) : S → R+ for each outcome
s ∈ S = S1 × · · · × Sn and U = {u1, · · · , un}.
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In this game, each player i utilizes the truncated α-
geometric mechanism to anonymize his data set Di. Let D
be the set of data set Di, i = 1, · · · , n. The strategy space
Si of player i is the set of privacy parameter i ∈ R+.
Correspondingly, some strategy si ∈ Si of player i is equal
to i.
For each player i, his payoff consists of two components,
i.e., the utility of the anonymized data set Fi(s) (positive
externalities) and the loss due to privacy leakage Li(s)
(negative externalities), which is given as follows:
ui(s) = Fi(s)− Li(s). (7)
In detail, for Fi(s) of player i with the truncated α-
geometric mechanism, it is just dependent on the privacy
parameter i = ln(1/α) rather than the privacy parameter
of its neighbors. Therefore, Fi(s) = Fi(si) and Equation (7)
is rewritten as
ui(s) = Fi(si)− Li(s). (8)
In order to construct a game model, the key step is to make
clear the following factors: (i) the correlated relationship
between different data sets under the case, in which every
data set owner takes different privacy parameter, (ii) util-
ity measures of anonymized data, i.e., Fi(·), and (iii) loss
measures if there is privacy leakage, i.e., Li(·).
5.2 Dynamic Correlation Relationship Model
Here, we use an undirected graph G(V, E) to present the pri-
vacy relationship between players, in which V = {1, · · · , n}
is the set of players and E is the set of the edges {i, j}.
If {i, j} ∈ E , there is an undirected edge from player
i to player j, which implies that there is the correlated
relationship between player i’s and j’s data sets. Otherwise,
there is no edge between player i and player j. A simple
example of an undirected graph is shown in Fig. 3, in which
the neighbors of player 2 are ne(2) = {1, 3, 4} and the
players who have the most neighbors are 2, 5, 6, 7.
For player i, he chooses the truncated α-geometric mech-
anism to perturb the output result. Once player i decides the
privacy parameter value  = ln 1/α, the output is derived
from the distribution, i.e., Equation (6), which is indexed by
si. Then, we define s = {s1, · · · , sn} ∈ Rn as a random
vector. Next, the key is to measure the privacy relationship
between multiple data sets. In the following, we take a sum
count query as an example to illustrate how to derive the
privacy level of player i.
5.3 Sum Count Query
When an adversary aims at some data set Di of player i, he
also utilizes the data sets of player i’s neighbors to enhance
the attack strength. In order to prevent the privacy leakage,
player i adopts the truncated α-geometric mechanism to
output the perturbed result. Suppose that there is a sum
count query Q(D) and the output of sum(D) is t. Hence,
the perturbed result is given by
o = t+ σ, (9)
in which t = sum(D) =
∑
i∈nDi and σ is the added noisy
via the truncated α-geometric mechanism.
Fig. 3: An example of the privacy relationship in correlated
data sets
As we discussed in Section 4.3, CDP is an extreme case of
BDP. That is, CDP sets up U = [n]\{i}\K andK = ∅. We re-
fer to [20] to compute the perturbed output of the sum count
query. Meanwhile, [20] has demonstrated that the weakest
adversary has the largest privacy leakage. Therefore, in our
paper, the adversary has the strongest attack due to K = ∅.
According to the definition of correlated differential privacy,





where p(σ|Di) is the correlation between the tuples and the
true query result, and p(o|σ) is the truncated α-geometric
mechanism. Next, p(o|Di) is defined as follows.
p(o|Di) = p(sT = σ −Di|Di), (11)




According to Equation (11), it is a key to compute p(sT =
σ − Di|Di), which is the privacy relationship of data sets
between player i and the others. Therefore, we set up D0 =∑
j:j 6=iDj/(n−1) and sT = (n−1)D0. In the following, we
refer to [20] and define the following matrix L to represent











However, the difference from [20] is that for elements of
matrix Li, we think they are dynamic values rather than
static values. The reason for this is that in our paper si is
the privacy parameter of player i and can be also used to
represent the probability distribution of the data and define
the relationship between different data sets. Therefore, we
re-define the elements of matrix Li.
Li represents the relationship between D0 and Di. More
precisely, Li0 is the relationship between D0 and D0 and
thereby can be composed by D−i, which is defined as
fi(s−i) ≥ 0. L0i = Li0 is the relationship between D0
and Di and thereby can be defined by gi(ne(si) ∪ si) ≥ 0.
Suppose that ∂gi/∂si ≥ 0 for si and ∂gi/∂sj ≥ 0 for
sj ∈ ne(si) since the relationship is degrading as any
variable decreases. Meanwhile, the function fi has the same
assumption, i.e., ∂fi/∂sj ≥ 0 for sj ∈ s−i.
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In [20], the authors have stated the result of the Bayesian
differential privacy leakage on the sum count query1. Since
in this paper the data publisher uses the truncated α-
geometric mechanism rather than the Laplace mechanism,
we refer to this and re-compute the result as follows.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the data publisher uses the trun-
cated α-geometric mechanism to output the perturbed
result on the sum count query, the correlated differential
privacy leakage of Li is







in which M is the maximum difference for different
values of si, gi represents the relationship between D0
and Di, and fi represents the relationship between D0
and D0.
Proof: According to the literature [20], we replace
Lap(λ) = e−|z|/λ with α|z| = e|z| lnα. That is, λ = − 1
lnα
. In
this case, it is easy to get Equation (13).
5.5 Utility Function
On one hand, the data publisher needs to consider the pri-
vacy parameter. On the other hand, he computes the utility
function of the anonymized data set, i.e., Fi(·). Here, for
the utility function Fi(·) of player i, we make the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1. The utility function Fi(·) for each player i is
a twice continuously differentiable function.
Assumption 2. In terms of privacy, the utility of each player
is degrading as the privacy preserving level is decreas-
ing. Therefore, the utility function Fi(·) of player i is
increasing with the privacy parameter si increasing.
Assumption 3. The utility function Fi(·) of player i is a
concave function. Similarly, the authors who considered
the information measure about the statistical privacy
theoretically make these same assumption [13]. Besides,
some application papers [46] [47] and this paper (Section
7) make experiments to demonstrate this assumption.
According to the above assumptions, the utility function
Fi(·) of each player i has the following characterization, i.e.,
∂Fi(·)
∂si




5.6 The Value of Privacy
As the idea of differential privacy [9], it is possible to cause
the privacy leakage, no matter what privacy parameter the
data publishers take. For example, when someone uses
differential privacy to output the perturbation result, the
adversary still has a certain probability to guess the true
input. In this case, the data publisher has to consider the
loss due to the privacy leakage. More precisely, Pai et al.
[48] surveyed the previous literature related to the value of
1. For the literature [20], we find that the result given by Theorem 3 is
not consistent with the corresponding proof. We check them and refer








privacy and concluded that the value of privacy is negative!
Hence, in our model, the value of privacy is a dis-utility.
It is natural to propose a fundamental question: how to
model the value for the privacy? In order to answer this
question, we refer to the idea of the literature [48], [49]
and think that there are two main factors to influence the
value of privacy, i.e., the privacy parameter and the privacy
value of player i. Suppose that for each player i, the value
of privacy is proportional to the privacy parameter , i.e.,
Li(si) = si · vi, (15)
where vi ≥ 0 is player i’s privacy valuation.
It is worth emphasizing that for -differential privacy as
well as the other related privacy definition (e.g., CDP in
our paper), the privacy parameter  just quantifies the worst
case harm that befall each player from revealing his private
data. This seems that si · vi is not a good measure for the
value of privacy. In order to illustrate this, we refer to the
explanation in the literature [49]. That is, si · vi is a good
and approximate bound of different measurements about
the value of privacy [50], [51]. Therefore, si · vi is a suited
measurement of the value of privacy and is applied into our
model.
6 GAME ANALYSIS
One of the fundamental objectives in game theory is to study
Nash equilibrium, i.e., the strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n),
in which a strategy decided by each player is the optimal
response to the strategies of the other players. In this section,
we mainly focus on discussing the pure Nash equilibrium
in the game.
6.1 Nash Equilibrium
In order to describe the Nash equilibrium, we firstly intro-
duce the notion of dominant strategies as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Dominant Strategies [30]). In a finite game
G = (N,S, U), for strategy si and s′i of player i, strategy
s′i is dominated by strategy si if for each feasible com-
bination of the other players’ strategies, i’s payoff with
strategy si is greater than or equal to i’s payoff with
strategy s′i:
(si, s−i) % (s′i, s−i) ⇐⇒ ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i).
(16)
Nash Equilibrium is one of the most common equilib-
riums. According to dominant strategies, the pure Nash
Equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 6.2 (Pure Nash Equilibrium [52]). In a finite game
G = (N,S, U), the strategy s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) is a pure
Nash Equilibrium if and only if, for each player i and
each feasible strategy si in Si, (s∗i , s
∗
−i) % (si, s∗−i).
Nash Equilibrium provides an important way of pre-
dicting what will happen if multiple players are interactive
with each other. If there exists pure Nash Equilibrium, it
means that no player will gain anything by changing only
his own strategy at this special state. That is, each player
makes his optimal choice, as long as the others’ choices
remain unchanged. In the following, we focus on analyzing
the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash Equilibrium.
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6.2 Equilibrium Analysis
In the following, we focus on the game analysis. Applying










in which si = lnα−1 and α ∈ (0, 1].
According to Definition 6.2, in a finite game, the strategy
profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) is Nash Equilibrium if, for each





−i). In the following, we discuss the existence of Nash
equilibrium points. Based on Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theo-
rem, Nash [52] has demonstrated that there always exists at
most one mixed Nash Equilibrium point for a game with a
finite number of players and a finite number of strategies.
However, for a pure Nash Equilibrium, it is not necessary.
Here, we give Theorem 6.3 to present the sufficient condi-
tions of the existence of the pure Nash Equilibrium in the
correlated privacy model.
Theorem 6.3. In the n-player game of correlated differential
privacy, in which the strategy profile is s and the payoff
function is ui, there are at least one Nash equilibriums if
it satisfies two sufficient conditions as follows. The first













Proof: In the game, it is easy to find that the strategy
set of player i, i.e., α ∈ [0, 1] and  = ln 1/α ∈ [0,+∞).
Suppose that the set of the strategy of each player is compact
and convex.
When we discuss the existence of the pure Nash Equilib-
rium in the game, it is a key to evaluate the payoff function
of each player, i.e., ui. In general, most of the previous litera-
ture is to demonstrate the existence of Nash Equilibrium via
verifying concavity of the payoff function [53]. Meanwhile,
another alternative approach is to demonstrate the existence
of Nash Equilibrium through verifying whether the game is
supermodular game [54]. That is, the payoff function of a
game is supermodular if and only if ∂2ui/∂si∂sj ≥ 0 for
i = 1, · · · , n and j 6= i. Combined with these two cases, if
there exists at least one pure Nash Equilibrium strategy in
the game, it needs to satisfy the following conditions, i.e.,
∂2ui/∂s
2
i ≤ 0 or ∂2ui/∂si∂sj ≥ 0 for all sj and j 6= i.
At first, we derive the first-order partial derivative of ui
































Next, the second-order cross-partial derivative with respect
to si and sj is that (i) when j is the neighbor of i, we have
∂2ui
∂si∂sj








































In Equation (22), since ∂2Fi/∂s2i ≤ 0, vi ≥ 0, M >
0 and fi > 0, the sufficient condition of ∂2ui/∂s2i ≤ 0 is





i ≥ 0. That is, the second-order
partial derivative of s2i gi with respect to si is greater than
or equal to 0. For Equations (23) and (24), both of them
need to be greater than or equal to 0. In order to satisfy this,
we derive the following requirements. In Equation (23), the




si and sj is less than or equal to 0. In Equation (24) with
∂fi/∂sj ≥ 0, the first-order partial derivate of s2i gi with
respect to si is greater than or equal to 0.
In the following, we consider a special case, in which
there exists only one pure Nash Equilibrium in the game,
and give the following sufficient condition. It is worth
emphasizing that it is hard to verify the uniqueness of pure
Nash Equilibrium in the game, since at present no known
works dominate [55].
Theorem 6.4. There exists a unique pure Nash Equilibrium
in the game if the corresponding Hessian Matrix, i.e.,
Equation (25), is negative quasi-definite.
Proof: According to the literature [55], if the following






























is negative quasi-definite, there is a unique pure Nash
Equilibrium.
6.3 Price of Anarchy
After we have demonstrated the existence and uniqueness
of pure Nash Equilibrium in the game, it is interesting and
important to evaluate the utility efficiency in the case of
Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, we refer to price of anarchy
(PoA) to measure the utility efficiency in the pure Nash
Equilibrium, which is the lowest ratio between the total
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in which s∗ is the strategy profile at pure Nash Equilibrium
and s′ is the strategy profile to maximize
∑
i ui(·). Note that
the value of PoA must be between 0 and 1.
Theorem 6.5. If ∂2(s2i gi)/∂s
2
i ≤ 0 and ∂(gi/fi)/∂sj ≥ 0 for



















Proof: In order to demonstrate the theorem, we refer
to the method in [56], in which the authors demonstrated the
upper bound of PoA in a cost-minimization game. Instead,
we aim to derive the lower bound of PoA in a utility-
maximization game.
Firstly, we have















and get ui =
Ui−visiM . At Nash Equilibrium, there may be two possible
cases listed as follows,{
∂Ui(s
∗)/∂si = viM if s∗i > 0
∂Ui(s
∗)/∂si < viM if s∗i = 0.
(28)
In Equation (28), the first equation means that there exists
the value s∗i > 0 so that ∂Ui/∂si = 0, while the second
equation implies ui is decreasing via si. Theorem 6.3 has
shown that ∂2(s2i gi)/∂s
2
i ≥ 0 is the sufficient condition of
∂2Ui/∂s
2
i ≤ 0, implying that Ui is concave. So, Ui(s∗) ≥
Ui(s









































in which v is the vector of vi. The reason from Equation




∗)/∂si > 0 and thereby
∑
k ∂Uk(s
∗)/∂si − viM > 0.







iviM . Otherwise, PoA is equal to 1.
























Besides, when s′ = 0, the right-hand side of Equation 29(b)
is equal to 1. Therefore, we complete this proof.
6.4 Remarks
Here, we mainly analyze the above theoretical results and
present some useful remarks.
If there exists the pure Nash Equilibrium in the game, we
have demonstrated two sufficient conditions. For the first
sufficient condition, i.e., ∂2(s2i gi)/∂s
2
i ≥ 0, it shows that
the existence of pure Nash Equilibrium is related to s2i gi.
More precisely, the function gi only includes those variables,
which are the neighbors of i. Therefore, whether or not
the pure Nash Equilibrium is existing in the first sufficient
condition fully depends on player i and his neighbors.
Meanwhile, since ∂(s2i gi)/∂si = 2sigi+s
2
i ∂gi/∂si ≥ 0, s2i gi
is an increasing and convex function.
For the second condition, it has two different cases.
When j is not the neighbor of i, since ∂(s2i gi)/∂si is always
greater than or equal to 0, this condition always holds. When


































≤ 0 holds if ∂
2(s2i gi)
∂si∂sj
≤ 0. Similar to the analysis
of the first sufficient condition, whether or not the pure Nash
Equilibrium is existing in the second sufficient condition
only depends on i and his neighbors. Combined with these
two sufficient conditions, the existence of the pure Nash
Equilibrium fully depends on each player and his neighbors.
On the other hand, we use PoA to evaluate efficiency of























, when i = k








≤ viM . If ∂Uk(s
∗)
∂sk






(vkM) ≥ 1 and thereby PoA is equal to
1. Therefore, considering the lower bound of PoA, we can
first consider player k, whose
∂Uk
∂sk




In order to describe the relationship between utility and
privacy, we attempt to conduct the experiment and derive
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Two simple models for correlated privacy relation-
ship. Two models are (a) Linear Model and (b) Start Model,
respectively.
the function Fi(·), based on the real data set. We adopt the
Adult data set from UCI machine learning repository [57],
which was extracted from the Census database and has been
widely applied to data analysis and anonymization. The
data set contains 32561 instances, which each consists of
15 attributes. In general, the data set can be used to predict
whether or not income of an individual exceeds $50, 000 a
year.
We take the prediction performance as the utility of
data. Most of the previous studies used the area under
the ROC curve (AUC) on the data set to measure the
prediction performance [47]. The higher the AUC, the better
the prediction performance is. In our experiments, we will
firstly use the privacy-preserving mechanism to anonymize
the data and then analyze the utility. Here, we use PrivBayes
[58] to achieve the anonymization of data and predict the
result, which is a differentially private method. In order
to reduce the error, we will repeat the experiment with
different private parameters in PrivBayes 50 times.
For the correlated privacy relationship, we construct two
simple models, i.e., linear and star model. In linear model,
only the first and last player have a neighbor, while the
others have two neighbors. Different from the linear model,
player 1 has n−1 neighbors and the others have only one in
star model. It is obvious that these two models are different
and used to make comparison.
7.1.2 Function Setup
Once we obtain the results between utility and privacy from
the experiments based on the real data set, we need to
choose the proper function to fit. Here, we use ln function
to fit the relationship between utility and privacy. Therefore,
we set
F(si) = α1 ln(si + α2) + α3, si > 0. (30)
When we consider function fi(·) and gi(·), it requires




























Fig. 5: Prediction accuracy by PrivBayes.
Then, we use λij to represent whether or not player j is
the neighbor of player i, which is given as follows
λij =
{
1, if j is connected to i
0, otherwise
(32)









In our experiments, we mainly discuss the relationship
between AUC and privacy budget in four different cases,
including no breach model (NBM), breach model (BM),
linear model (LM), and star model (SM). NBM is a case
where we don’t consider the loss due to privacy breach,
while BM refers to the case of loss due to privacy breach
in a single data set. Both LM and SM consider the loss
of privacy breach in correlated data sets. The correlated
privacy relationship between different players in LM and
SM is shown in Fig. 4.
We firstly observe the relationship between privacy
budget and the prediction accuracy. In these experiments,
we repeat each privacy budget value 50 times to reduce
the error. Fig. 5 shows the corresponding results between
privacy budget and the prediction accuracy. It is easy to find
that as the privacy budget increases, the prediction accuracy
is increasing. We can also find that the growth rate from 0
to 0.2 of privacy budget is faster than that from 0.2 to 2.
Meanwhile, this illustrates the importance of the choice of
privacy budget.
Although Fig. 5 is able to show the relationship between
privacy budget and prediction performance, we still use
AUC as the standard performance metric, which is widely
applied to most prediction systems. Meanwhile, we use
curve fitting toolbox in MATLAB to fit the function Fi(·).
It is intuitive to see that AUC has the similar changes with
prediction accuracy. In addition, Fig 6. shows the fit function
is Fi(si) = 0.05811 ∗ ln(si + 0.001) + 0.7652. According to
the R-square index which is equal to 0.8368, it is proper to
use the fit function.
After we obtain the fit function Fi(·) and other impor-
tant functions, it is able to observe the AUC in different
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Fig. 6: Relationship between privacy budget and AUC. We
use PrivBayes to obtain the AUC in different budget privacy.
Then, we use curve fitting toolbox in MATLAB to fit the
function between privacy budget and AUC. The related
parameter to show the goodness of fit is SSE = 0.02342,
R− square = 0.8306, and RMSE = 0.05784.


















Fig. 7: AUC in different scenarios.
scenarios, including NBM, BM, LM, and SM. Here, we
mainly consider player 1 in two models shown in Fig. 4 and
assume that the other players choose the same and constant
privacy budget. Fig. 7 shows results about the relationship
between privacy budget and AUC in these four scenarios.
Comparing NBM and BM, we can see that AUC of NBM
is greater than that of BM due to considering the loss of
privacy breach. It implies that when someone is sensitive
to privacy, it inevitably decreases the utility of data due
to data anonymization. On the other hand, AUC of BM is
greater than that of LM and SM, which means that under the
same privacy requirement, the cost to preserve the privacy
in correlated data sets is higher than that in a single dataset.
The cost of player 1 in SM is greater than that in LM,
since player 1 in SM faces the more correlated data sets.
Last but not least, the function of both LM and SM is a
concave function, which shows that the game has the Nash
Equilibrium. This was demonstrated by the literature [59].
This shows the requirements in Theorem 6.3 are correct.
Fig. 8 shows AUC of player 1 in LM and SM when the
privacy budget of the other players changes. Since player
1 in SM is in a key position, the increasing privacy budget


















Fig. 8: AUC influenced by the others’ privacy.
of the other players significantly influences his privacy com-
pared with that in LM, which is shown in Fig. 8. On the other
hand, if value v1 of player 1 in SM is greater than others,
the lower bound of PoA is possibly determined by player 1
when we don’t consider the other factors. Meanwhile, when
privacy budget of the neighbors of player 1 is less than 1,
the privacy of player 1 has little change.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the problem of the privacy preserv-
ing analysis in correlated data publication. As the privacy
level of some data set is dependent on its and its neighbors’
privacy parameters, it is changed from the trade-off prob-
lem to a game problem when data publisher considers his
privacy parameter to maximizing his utility. We defined the
correlated differential privacy to evaluate the real privacy
level of a single data set influenced by the other data sets.
Then, we constructed a game model of multiple players,
who each publishes the data set sanitized by differential
privacy. Next, we demonstrated the sufficient conditions of
the existence and uniqueness of the pure Nash Equilibrium.
We also referred to the price of anarchy to get the efficiency
of the pure Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we presented the
correctness of our game analysis via extensive experiments.
In the future, based on the game analysis in this paper,
we attempt to find the most critical data publisher, who has
the greatest impact on the privacy level of his neighbors.
Thereby, we will make some useful measures to improve
the overall utility in the game.
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